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On June 11th, 1990, the United States and Mexico announced their intention to 
negotiate a free-trade agreement. This announcement, soon followed by the launching o f  the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), on June 27, 1990, raised the prospects o f  future 
free-trade agreements between the U.S. and other Latin American countries. After much 
debate, Canada decided to join the negotiations. On February 5, 1991, all three countries, 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States, declared their intention to negotiate a trilateral 
regional agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
A successful NAFTA raises the possibility o f  additional free trade agreements (FTA) 
between the U.S. and other nations o f  the region. Beyond this possibility, lessons for 
countries entering into trade negotiations with the United States may also be drawn from the 
NAFTA process. This process proves that much can be learned from the debate on the 
formulation o f  the U.S. trade negotiating position.
This paper surveys a set o f  testimonies presented at several regional hearings on the 
NAFTA held by U.S. trade negotiators. These unprecedented hearings provide a clear 
illustration o f  the interests that will be potentially affected by the negotiating issues contained 
in the NAFTA. The ebb and flow o f  the hearings emerges from how different interests 
perceive that they would be affected by a free-trade agreement. The remainder o f  the paper 
is divided into four sections. Section II examines recent amendments to U.S. trade legislation 
that made the NAFTA an unprecedented negotiation. Section III considers the participants 
and the issues they addressed in the hearings. Section IV focuses on specific testimonies and 
analyzes the positions o f  certain interests groups with regards to eleven negotiating issues. 
This section serves as the core o f  the paper, highlighting the arguments presented by some o f  
the witnesses that testified. The final section makes observations about how these hearings 
may be o f  relevance in the context o f  future free trade negotiations.
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988
The U.S. political system is characterized by the dynamic o f  "checks and balances" 
between the branches o f  government as a means o f  preventing the undue concentration o f  
power. A manifestation o f  this concern for diffusion o f  authority can be found in how the 
legislative branch is invested with the constitutional jurisdiction over the conduct o f  foreign 
trade, with the executive branch in charge o f  policy implementation. This structure has 
remained the base o f  trade policy since the enactment o f  the U.S. Constitution over two 
centuries ago.
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Since at least the Great Depression o f  the 1930’ s, "tension" in U.S. trade 
policymaking has existed between the legislative and the executive branch. This tension or 
"cry and sigh" syndrome,1 arises as mounting protectionist pressures from constituents and 
industry converge on the U.S. Congress-- the "cry". After grave predictions, heavy 
legislative horsetrading, and executive prodding, the debates conclude with the "sigh" —the 
approval o f  a trade bill. However, the resulting legislation has not been as protectionist as 
expected and remains congruent with the open trading relationships that have characterized 
the postwar international trading system.
The approval o f  the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act o f  1988 (OTCA) may 
be seen as an illustrative example o f  the "cry and sigh" syndrome. It is one o f  the most 
sweeping pieces o f  commercial policy legislation ever approved in the United States, 
stemming in part from concern with increasing trade deficits.2 The OTCA provided a new 
framework for U.S. commercial relations, specifically clarifying issues regarding U.S. 
responses to foreign trade barriers and outlining the present structure for the formulation o f 
U.S. trade policy.
Specifically, the OTCA frames the negotiating process necessary to arrive at a trade 
agreement into three stages:
Stage 1 can be defined as the debate in Congress o f  whether to extend fast-track 
authority to the President, with the intention o f  consolidating and facilitating the 
negotiation and approval o f  the agreement.
Stage 2 occurs after fast track authority has been extended to the Executive. With the 
trade "football", as it were, in the Executive’ s camp, the process moves to an 
information gathering period, in order to shape the negotiating position prior to the 
actual negotiation o f  the agreement.
Stage 3 develops as the final agreement text is presented to both Houses o f  Congress 
for a vote. Given that the agreement was negotiated under fast-track authority, the 
Congress may vote only on the final version without adding amendments. Hence, 
while the Executive has added authority in the negotiating process to avoid overdrawn 
congressional battles over the fine points o f  an agreement, Congressional oversight 
was enhanced and its authority over foreign commerce affirmed by the OTCA.
'Robert Pastor, "The Cry and Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy," in Making Economic 
Policy In Congress, ed. Allen Schick ( Washington D .C .: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 
1983), pp. 158-195.
2Omnihus Trade and Competitiveness Act o f  1988.(Washington. DC: US Government Printing Office, 
April 20, 1988).
To be sure, the OTCA redefined the roles o f  the Presidency and the Congress, in part 
by "requiring increased consultation". Part 2 o f  Title I o f  the OTCA, entitled "Hearings and 
Advice Concerning Negotiations", includes provisions that force the USTR, the chief 
negotiating arm o f  the Executive, to seek advice from: 1) the International Trade 
Commission, 2) executive departments and other sources, and 3) public hearings. If the 
Executive fails to comply with these provisions, the Congress has the prerogative to enact a 
"procedural disapproval resolution" which would remove the President’ s fast-track authority 
if  approved by both chambers. In these terms, public hearings may be held by Congress 
when the extension o f  fast track authority is being debated. Additionally, the stipulation that 
the USTR should also hold public hearings when the negotiating position is still to be defined 
is a key and distinct component found in the OTCA.
As a point o f  comparison, the Canadian trade policy process does not include this 
type o f  "bottom-up"mechanism. Michael Hart, Canadian negotiator o f  the U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement, describes the Canadian process as more top-heavy. In Canada, the 
negotiating positions are crafted from the top, designed by experts and technicians. Only 
when the negotiating position is defined are consultations initiated. This approach contrasts 
with the U.S. system, where open consultations take place during the construction o f  the 
negotiating position.3
III. THE TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE (TPSC) HEARINGS
The NAFTA negotiating process did follow the three stages framed by the OTCA.
The first set o f  hearings in the Congress with regards to the extension o f  fast-track authority 
were initiated in March and April o f  1991. The key hearings were held in the Senate Finance 
and House Ways and Means Committee, the primary legislative committees for trade 
matters.4 These hearings marked the first stage o f  the U.S. trade formulation process and 
dealt with the transfer o f  negotiating authority. Since only the extension o f  fast-track 
authority was being considered, the hearings were broad and general. By contrast, the 
hearings held in the next stage by the USTR Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) were 
significantly more detailed.5
3Michael Hart, Reconcilable Differences: Negotiating the Free-Trade Agreement. (Ottawa: April 3, 
1990), pp. 17-18
Statement o f  Ambassador Carla A. Hills. US Trade Representative before the Subcommittee on Trade. 
Committee on Wavs and Means. United States House o f  Representatives. (Washington, DC: February 20, 1991)
3 The Brock Group, LTD ., The Formulation and Implementation o f  US Trade Policy. (Washington,
DC: July 24, 1992)
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The TPSC is the front-line mechanism for handling trade responsibilities in the 
Executive branch. It is chaired by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) staff but 
also depends on input from other agencies. These federal agencies include: the U.S. 
Departments o f  Agriculture; Commerce; Energy; Labor; State; Treasury; the Environmental 
Protection Agency; and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Senior civil servants with 
the most knowledge on trade matters in their respective agencies serve on the TPSC, which 
is made up o f  60 subcommittees and several ad-hoc task forces. Besides chairing the 
committee, the USTR assigns responsibilities, thus, coordinating in this way U.S. trade 
policymaking.
With the extension o f  fast-track authority, the USTR set out to formulate the position 
to be adopted in negotiating NAFTA. In a report, transmitted to the Congress on May 1, 
1991, the Executive committed itself to consulting fully with the Congress and the private 
sector, as well as undertaking a review o f  environmental issues.6 In addition to consulting 
heavily with both Congress and the private sector, the administration also decided to hold an 
"unprecedented series o f  public hearings on NAFTA in six American cities."7
The administration solicited public comments on the proposed agreement through 
these hearings because it was "intensely interested in how the public views free trade with 
Mexico. These hearings [would] be an invaluable aid to our negotiators in their effort to 
obtain an agreement that is beneficial to the United States."8
The USTR advertised the hearings in the Federal Register, stating that a series o f  six 
public hearings before the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) would be held in: San 
Diego on August 21, Houston on August 26, Atlanta on August 29, Washington D.C. on 
September 3-5, Cleveland on September 9, and Boston on September I I .9 Persons interested 
in testifying were asked to contact the USTR and could testify in person at the hearings 
and/or submit a written testimony. Over 200 witnesses testified in person and over 400 
written submissions were received. The information gathered at these hearings would be 
disseminated to all negotiating groups and interested officials, consonant with prior 
announcements.
The hearings’ objective was further clarified by David Weiss, the Chairman o f the 
TPSC, in his opening statement presented at the initiation o f  the testimonies. He stated that 
the goal o f  the committee was "to concentrate on developing information, conducting
‘ President George Bush, Response o f  the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection With The 
Negotiation o f  A  North American Free Trade Agreement. (May 1, 1991), p .12
7 The White House, Report o f  the Administration on The North American Free Trade Agreement and 
Actions Taken In Fulfillment o f  the May 1. 1991 Commitments.(Sept. 18, 1992).
8 Office o f  the USTR, Official Press Release. (July 15, 1991)
fe d e ra l Register N otice. (July 16, 1991), pp. 32454-32457
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domestic consultations and seeking advice from those concerned on the nature and scope o f 
the negotiations, and on identifying the key issues for negotiation." Addressing the 
participants in the first hearing, he also added that the timing o f  the hearings had been 
designed "to enable you to present your views so that your testimony and briefs may be fully 
considered and taken into account prior to the nitty-gritty o f  the negotiations." Outlining the 
agenda and stressing the fact that these were information-gathering hearings, David Weiss 
added that "we seek your input on the full range o f  issues. W e seek your comments in 
particular on the economic costs and benefits to U.S. producers and consumers o f  removal o f 
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, on potential service sectors to be included in an 
agreement and the economic costs and benefits o f  removal o f  such service barriers, on the 
costs and benefits o f  removing restrictions on direct investment, on the adequacy o f  existing 
customs measures and on appropriate rules o f  origin, and on possible environmental effects 
o f  a N AFTA ."10
O f the 223 oral testimonies presented to the TPSC, 148 were randomly chosen and 
surveyed for this study, serving as a sample o f  the range o f  issues raised during the hearings. 
The testimonies examined were taken from all six o f  the hearings held in August and 
September o f  1991. A breakdown o f the participants and issues raised during these hearings 
follows below.
1. The Participants
Witnesses at the hearings represented a vast spectrum o f  interests which included: 
corporations; producers; consumer and trade associations; labor and environmental groups; 
local governments; academics; and religious groups. The majority o f  witnesses were from the 
U .S., although several Mexican firms and associations participated as well. Figure 1 shows 
the diversity o f  the groups and interests represented at the hearings, drawing the percentages 
from the 223 oral testimonies presented.
'“David Weiss, Chairman o f  the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Opening Statement for the TPSC 
Hearings: North American Free Trade Agreement. (San Diego: August 21, 1991) pp. 6-8.
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2. The Issues
The issues were determined according to the structure o f  the NAFTA negotiating 
groups, as described by Chairman Weiss in his opening statement. He stated that they would 
break down the issues "into 18 negotiating groups falling under 6 broad categories: Market 
Access (including tariffs and non tariff barriers, rules o f  origin, and government 
procurement), Trade Rules (such as standards and safeguards), Services, Investment, 
Intellectual Property Rights, and Dispute Settlement."11 Labor and the Environment 
were also named by Weiss as additional issues. All these categories served as the principal 
framework for the negotiations.
11 Ibid.. p. 6.
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Figure 2 presents the 
breakdown o f  the issues 
raised by the 148 
testimonies analyzed. The 
testimonies proved not to 
be mutually exclusive; 
many o f  the witnesses at 
the hearings discussed 
more than one o f  the 
categorized issues. This 
graph shows the 
frequency with which the 
issues were mentioned by 
business or non-business 
interest groups. Market 
access issues clearly 
raised the most concern, 
as approximately 50% o f 
the testimonies surveyed 
discussed them. The 
graph is arranged in 
descending order, ending 
with Dispute Settlement 
as the issue that was least 
mentioned. Predictably, 
non-business interests mentioned labor and environmental issues more frequently than 
business groups.
IV. THE TESTIMONIES
The themes o f  the hearings surveyed reveal the clash o f  conflicting views on free 
trade. Both at a specific and at a general level, witnesses asserted their opposition or support, 
justifying their position with facts that varied from careful statistics to anecdotal evidence, 
with other witnesses ready to rebut these arguments in their testimonies. In sum, the hearings 
reflected the contentious nature o f  free trade, a subject which provokes strong reactions 
among many witnesses.12
In addition to the testimonies presented by U.S. and Mexican participants, some 
Caribbean representatives also provided testimonies, using the opportunity to voice concerns 
from a general perspective regarding the possible effects o f  NAFTA on their own economies.
Figure 2 Breakdown of the Issues
12A11 o f  the following information was drawn directly from the written testimonies.
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For instance, the Governor o f  the U.S. Virgin Islands, Alexander A. Farrelly, 
expressed fear that NAFTA would undermine the gains from the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(C B I)- the preferential trading regime that exists between the U.S. and the Caribbean states- 
by diverting trade o f  sensitive commodities, such as rum, to Mexican producers. He 
emphasized his point by noting that rum sales, as the greatest source o f  revenue, o f  some 
Caribbean economies, were helping to pay for necessary repairs in the aftermath o f  
Hurricane Hugo.
The Secretary o f  State o f  the Commonwealth o f  Puerto Rico, Antonio J. Colorado 
had similar concerns to those o f  Governor Farrelly. In addition to concerns regarding the 
rum trade, he wanted to see better security for CBI benefits under NAFTA and also asked 
for adjustment assistance for Puerto Rico, in the areas o f  textile, apparel and leather goods.
The discussion that follows will provide a narrative o f  specific case studies o f  
testimonies, using the framework o f  the 6 negotiating groups adopted by the TPSC and the 
USTR. In addition, the issues o f  labor and the environment will also be considered. Given 
that market access issues proved to have elicited the most concern at these hearings, special 
attention will be granted to issues such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, rules o f  origin, 
agriculture, and automobiles.
The case studies were chosen to highlight the unprecedented role that the TPSC public 
hearings had in the formulation o f  the U.S. trade negotiating position. Also, a comparison o f 
the testimonies provided with the references to the NAFTA text reveal the influence that a 
given industry or organization had in the formulation o f  the U.S. position. Other factors 
clearly contributed to the formulation o f  the U.S. trade position in a given area. However, 
the influence a given industry or group had in setting tariff schedules, phase-outs, or the 
maintenance o f  quotas can be inferred from the position adopted at the hearings.
1. Com Brooms: Phase-Outs
With reference to tariff reduction, prior to the initiation o f  the hearings, the USTR 
adopted a "no exclusions" stance, meaning all products and industries would be considered 
for tariff reduction. Specific and in-depth information was needed to best allocate products 
for immediate, medium-term or long-term phase-out periods. One such testimony highlighted 
these challenges. One o f  the smaller companies to testify was Vining Industries, Inc. Harry 
Levanthal, the founder and president o f  the company, made a heartfelt plea for the exclusion 
o f  com-brooms from the NAFTA. As a small broom-manufacturer based in Springfield, 
Ohio, and as a representative o f  the broom factories, he pointed out that 30 years ago there 
were about 800 such factories in the U.S. Now, the number o f  these small factories, the 
majority family-owned businesses, have dwindled to 200. He blamed the huge, low- 
production cost o f  Mexican broom factories for this decrease, and felt that the elimination o f  
tariffs on Mexican brooms would eventually lead to the disappearance o f  the U.S. broom-
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making industry, under a deluge o f  cheap imports. He stated that the industry:
"desperately need[s] an exclusion o f  com  brooms from the new trade bill 
under consideration and that tariffs and quotas should remain intact. Please do 
not disturb this already fragile industry, so these small family companies can 
stay in business."13
Although much smaller than many o f  the other firms testifying, Vining Industries 
provided stirring testimony that was indeed considered by the committee. Given that the 
preliminary stance had been one o f  "no-exclusions", it was impossible to exclude brooms 
from the NAFTA. However, the com  broom industry was granted the longest phase-out 
period available, that o f  15 years, in order to facilitate adjustment to the free market.14 This 
phase-out period was granted only to very sensitive products. The broom industry, 
considering its size, would perhaps have been overlooked had they not testified so forcefully 
at these hearings.
2. Orange Juice: Market Share
In contrast to Vining Industries, the much larger citrus industry from the state o f  
Florida was able to mobilize a potent network in opposition to the NAFTA. Stating that the 
NAFTA would be "catastrophic to the market" in the United States, the governmental 
Florida Department o f  Citrus and the trade association, Florida Citrus Packers, among many 
others, made a strong argument for complete exclusion o f  the citrus industry. Testifying on 
August 29, 1991, in Atlanta, Georgia, these groups described several ways in which free 
trade with Mexico in this market sector would be harmful and dangerous to the U.S. 
industry. One o f  their primary complaints was that o f  lower production costs in Mexico. 
They identified lower labor costs, government subsidies and a lack o f  necessary capital 
investment in land as the primary factors leading to the Mexican lower prices and, by 
extension, their unfair competitive edge. The citrus network also cited the following as unfair 
Mexican advantages:
* lax environmental and food safety standards that allow the Mexican producers 
to avoid these regulations and thus lower their production costs as well.
* the Mexican industry poses an even greater threat in the future as they hold
'■Testimony by Harry Levanthal, President, Vining Industries, ( Cleveland: September 9, 1991)
14Tariff phase-out period applies to all Mexican com  brooms after the first 100,000 dozen. The first
100,000 dozen brooms, under the NAFTA provisions, would enter duty-free beginning January 1994. See 
Office o f  the USTR, NAFTA Tariff Reduction Schedules. (Washington, DC: September 8, 1992), sections 
9603.10-9603.40
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more acreage dedicated to citrus production than Florida; moreover, 45 % o f  
that area is not bearing yet.
* safety and phytosanitary standards are flaccid at best and will pose health and 
safety standards.
* rules o f  origin raise fears that other countries will use Mexico as a 
transshipment point for duty free entry into the U.S.
In a word, this strong coalition o f  both government and trade associations characterized the 
citrus industry as a precarious sector in need o f  nurturing trade protection that, hence, should 
be excluded from NAFTA.
However, the Mexican industry was able to counterargue. During the hearings held 
on September 5, 1991, in Washington D .C ., the Mexican interests stressed that Mexican 
exports would not inundate the U.S. market. More clearly, The Mexican National Citrus 
Processors Association contradicted assertions that Mexican producers o f  frozen concentrated 
orange juice (FCOJ) for manufacturing and fresh juice were thriving in the U.S. market. 
Mexico remains a "very distant source o f  supply for the U.S. market", and Mexican imports 
are used for blending with U.S. or Brazilian juice. U.S. sources currently supply about 65% 
o f  the orange juice needed by the U.S. processors, with Brazil being the primary external 
source, supplying about 85% in 1990 o f  imported FCOJ. The Mexican producers stated that 
there is an insufficient supply in the U.S. to satisfy the demand, therefore 35% o f  the orange 
juice must be imported, primarily from Brazil.15 It was also suggested that Mexican imports 
would basically replace some o f  the Brazilian imports and therefore they would not hurt the 
U.S. domestic market. The Mexican Citrus Association further highlighted constraints to the 
industry’ s potential to increase their U.S. penetration under NAFTA. Besides legal 
restrictions on land ownership which are in the process o f  being reformed, "relatively 
unsophisticated grove management and care techniques and poor land productivity result in 
the yield per acre in Mexico being only 1/4 o f  that in the U.S. and 1/2 o f  that in Brazil." 
Thus, Mexican groves are relatively less productive.
Both U.S. and Mexican citrus groups presented cogent cases. On account o f  its 
sensitivity, orange juice became a special case in the final agreement. Although it was not 
excluded, it was granted also the longest phase-out period o f  fifteen years. However, 
indicative o f  the strength o f  the arguments lodged by the Mexican producers, the in-quota 
tariffs for FCOJ were reduced by 50%, effective January 1994. Additionally, the phase-out 
was set so that in 15 years, the quotas and tariffs, following different phase-out schedules, 
would both be eliminated. In order to best protect both U.S. and Mexican interests and to
,5Testimony by Juan Carlos Zambrano, Alberto de la Fuente, and Irwin P. Altschuler o f  the Mexican 
National Citrus Processors Association, (Washington, D .C .: September 9, 1991)
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respond to the concerns regarding transshipment o f  citrus from other countries, a high rule o f  
origin o f  100% is set on both fresh and frozen concentrated orange juice.16
3. Glassware: Import Penetration
Glassware also was a polemical issue between U.S. industries and their Mexican 
counterparts. United States glassware producers made a strong case for the exclusion o f  
glassware products from the agreement, based on the import sensitivity o f  this industry. A 
witness from Libbey Glass (a unit o f  Owens-Illinois) argued that GSP law, tariff schedules 
themselves, trade statistics, and an International Trade Commission (ITC) study attest to the 
sensitivity o f  the industry, as well as to the fact that the share o f  foreign penetration in the 
U.S. glassware market has grown, on a value basis, from 22% to 45% in the last ten years. 
This representative from Libbey Glass stated that glassware imports from Mexico alone 
increased from $8 million in 1979 to almost $19 million in 1991 (the current year) and that 
Mexican products account for over 15% o f the total volume o f  glassware imports. The 
impact o f  foreign penetration was illustrated by a representative o f  Anchor Hocking 
Consumer Glass Company (a division o f  Newell Company) who stated that: "Since 1978 
more than half o f  the glass manufacturing plants in the United States have closed, including 
two o f  Anchor Hocking’ s plants, one in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and another in 
Lancaster, O hio."17 In terms o f  the impact on employment, the witness stated that "excess 
capacity, declining production and operating losses have caused more than 21,000 American 
glassware workers to lose their jobs since 1979." The president o f  the industrial glass 
company o f  Anchor Hocking emphasized that import penetration for industrial glassware, at 
55 %, was currently even higher than for consumer glassware.
Differences in labor costs were cited as part o f  the explanation for import sensitivity. 
The deposition o f  Libbey Glass stated that labor represents about 50% o f  the U.S. industry’ s 
total costs and that, according to the Bureau o f  Labor Statistics, the U.S. industry’ s wage is 
$15.26 per hour, compared with the Mexican industry’ s rate o f  $1.39 per hour. In addition 
to emphasizing the wage differential between Mexican and U.S. industries, Anchor Hocking 
identified the lower energy costs o f  Mexican producers as well.
Several Mexican glassware manufacturers took advantage o f  the hearings to also state 
their case. Orion, S.A. argued that Mexican exports did not have the impact that the U.S. 
industry had stated. Rather, "Mexican exports account for only 3% o f total U.S. domestic 
consumption and basically compete in the low end o f  the market. Further, these exports
16 Office o f  the USTR, NAFTA Tariff Schedule. (Washington, D C: September 8, 1992), section
2009.11.00
l7Testimony by Fredric Contino, Representative o f  Anchor Hocking Glassware, (Washington, DC: 
September 4, 1991)
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compete with exports from other countries such as Taiwan, Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia 
and do not compete with most o f  the U.S. production."18 The general director o f  Vitromex,
S .A ., Rodolfo Fernandez also argued against the claims that Mexican companies were 
subsidized and that labor conditions were below standards. He stated that "we want to 
emphasize that the working conditions in the major Mexican tile plants are comparable to the 
U.S. plants and all other ceramic tile plants worldwide."19
However, attesting to the sensitivity to foreign penetration into the U.S. glassware 
markets is the slow pace o f  tariff elimination stipulated for these products in the NAFTA 
text. More clearly, the liberalization phase-in period for about 67% o f  glassware product 
lines, whereby all tariffs would be eliminated, is 15 years, the longest transition period 
stipulated in the NAFTA text.20
4. The Textile Industry: A New Stance
The hearings also revealed new tendencies among the U.S. producers. For example, 
the textile sector, traditionally protectionist, was more open and came out in favor o f  the 
NAFTA. The Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition (RITAC), a broad-based coalition o f  
American apparel manufacturers, apparel retailers, retail trade associations, and other 
associations involved in international trade, testified at the hearings in Washington D .C. on 
September 5, 1991. Representing companies such as the GAP, The Limited, J.C. Penney, 
K-Mart, Wamaco, Macy’ s and others, RITAC stated its strong support for the negotiation o f  
a NAFTA, specifically requesting not to be excluded. In its own words: "RITAC has one 
basic request to make o f  the negotiators: don’ t forget textiles and apparel in the trade 
liberalization process." They added that "without the many obstacles to production-sharing 
that still exist, U.S. manufacturers could draw on the differing competitive advantages o f 
Mexico and the U .S., producing a more robust industry able to take on competitors from 
Europe and the Pacific Rim ."21
Specifically requesting the elimination o f  quotas, the phase-out o f  tariffs, a strong, 
single rule o f  origin, and uniform labelling, the textile industry basically used the opportunity 
o f  the hearings to present a new stance and to try to influence the negotiation platform o f  the
l8Testimony by Jorge Foster, Representative o f  Orion, S .A ., (Washington, DC: September 4, 1991) 
'^Testimony by R odolfo Hernandez, General Director, Vitromex, S .A ., (Washington, D C: September
4, 1991)
20 See Office o f  the USTR, N A FTA  Tariff Reduction Schedule (Washington, DC: September 8, 1992), 
for HTS items 7010.10.00 to 7014.00.50. for information on the specific product lines involved.
21Testimony provided by Doral S. Cooper, President, C&M  International, on behalf o f  RITAC, 
(Washington, DC: September 5, 1991)
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USTR. In the NAFTA text, the textile industry is accorded the medium range phase-out o f 
10 years, with most o f  the tariffs being essentially phased-out in 6 years. There is also a 
strong rule o f  origin stipulation, significantly stronger than that o f  the U.S.-Canada FTA.22 
In the NAFTA, textile and apparel goods must pass a "triple transformation test", essentially 
meaning that all finished products must be cut and sewn from fabric spun from North 
American fibers. However, goods that are made from fibers that are in short supply in 
North America, such as silk and linen, are partially exempt from this "fiber forward" rule.23
5. The Automobile Industry: Rules o f  Origin
Rules o f  origin were discussed by many witnesses and clearly were a major concern 
for the automobile producers. Foreign competition intensified throughout the past decade, 
while profits and employment declined in the North American automotive sector. Major 
producers (including the U.S. Big Three: General Motors, Ford and Chrysler) have increased 
their global sourcing o f  parts and components. More recently, the Mexican automotive 
industry has been expanding, with a strong presence o f  the Big Three, as well as Nissan and 
Volkswagen. The fastest growth has taken place in the auto parts industry, which is clearly 
dominated by the U.S. firms. The Mexican increase in automotive production and auto part 
sales resulted from the slight relaxation in Mexico o f  foreign direct investment measures 
introduced by the 1989 Auto Decree and the flourishing o f  exports o f  auto parts entering the 
U.S. under preferential HTS subheadings 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the issue o f  rules o f  origin in NAFTA, which 
affects global sourcing and investment decisions in the region, was such a concern to the 
automobile companies which testified at the hearings. When the Big Three released their 
demands regarding NAFTA, rules o f  origin were a major component. General Motors, 
Chrysler, and Ford were emphatic about maintaining the 50% ad valorem rule as stipulated 
in the U.S.-Canada FTA regarding trade o f  auto parts with Canada. However, Chrysler and 
Ford were pressing for 70% regional content, while GM wanted only 60% in trade with 
Mexico. This divergence within the industry illustrates the difficulties o f  achieving a 
consensus on this issue, which was one o f  the last to be resolved during the negotiations.
The central question was how to resolve the so-called "roll-up" problem. The problem 
surfaced publicly when Honda o f  America was accused by U.S. Customs that its accounts 
allegedly showed that the firm’ s sourcing practices produced autos that did not meet the 50%
22In the US-Canada FTA there is a rule o f  origin o f  "double transformation"; that is, finished products 
are required to be cut and sewn into garment parts in either Canada or the United States, in order to qualify for 
FTA preferential treatment.
^Office o f  the USTR, The North American Free Trade Agreement. (Washington, DC: September 6, 
1992), Section XI, Chapters 50-63, pp. 4-58 thru 4-78.
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value-added test specified in the U.S.-Canada FTA. During the TPSC hearings, Honda also 
testified to complain about the vagueness o f  the rules o f  origin established under the bilateral 
free trade agreement.
The roll-up problem resulted from the method used to determine the origin o f  parts. 
Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, auto parts were accounted for as being 100% North American, 
whenever 50% o f  their content was produced in either country. Hence, in the calculation o f 
the total North American content o f  motor vehicles, there seemed to be a bias in favor o f  
lower regional content. However, Honda explained that U.S.-Canada FTA rules were vague 
concerning what constituted production costs. For instance, is plant depreciation a cost that 
should be included in the value contents o f  products?
The NAFTA, as initialed, attempts to resolve the issue o f  rules o f  origin for 
automobiles. Although the value contents requirement has been raised, the method o f  
calculation has been replaced by a "net cost" approach. This method takes into account the 
total cost o f  production, establishes that 62.5% o f the net cost o f  autos, light trucks, engines, 
and transmissions, and 60% o f  the net cost for other vehicles and parts must be incurred 
within the NAFTA area.24
6. Investment: Opening the Door
The opinions expressed by the witnesses were on a whole receptive to the investment 
opportunities a NAFTA would provide. Generally, NAFTA was seen as an equalizer that 
would "level the playing field", as a means to increase the opening o f  M exico’ s capital 
markets and corporations. The prompt removal o f  restrictions to foreign investment in 
Mexico was the main focus o f  some testimonies. Removal o f  restrictions, it was argued, 
would benefit M exico’ s interests as well as those o f  the U.S. To this end, the American 
Petroleum Institute, a trade association representing over 250 companies, argued that since 
M exico’ s petroleum sector will be unable to reverse recent declines in its productive 
capacity, removing restrictions to investment in petroleum could attract capital and 
technology that would increase productivity. Mexican refineries, it was stated, operated at 
about 97% capacity during the first quarter o f  1991, while one o f M exico’ s nine refineries 
was forced to close down for environmental reasons. Declining production combined with 
growing domestic demand may turn M exico into an oil importer before the turn o f  the 
century. By removing restrictions and attracting investment, the Mexican industry would thus 
be able to meet growing demand, shift the product mix, and satisfy more stringent 
environmental standards. Overall, NAFTA was seen by both U.S. and Mexican firms as a 
means o f  stabilizing financial markets, "locking in" M exico’ s recent macroeconomic 
adjustments, and ensuring a level o f  transparency in investment.
^O ffice o f  the USTR, The North American Free Trade Agreement. (Washington, DC: September 6, 
1992), Chapter 4, Article 403, pp. 4-6 thru 4-10
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7. Services: Gaining Access
Under the framework o f  the NAFTA negotiating groups, transport and financial 
services were negotiated separately. Views on the restrictiveness o f  the Mexican market were 
abundantly represented by varied interests, with the bulk o f  the testimonies addressing 
obstacles to U.S. transport access and issues o f  reciprocity. It was argued that barriers to 
trade in services produce inefficiencies that hamper the price competitiveness o f  traded 
merchandise. The Texas Motor Transportation Association suggested that motor carrier 
transportation be excluded from NAFTA, if  Mexico were to remain unwilling to remove 
impediments to free access. There have been subsequent efforts at deregulation but foreign 
nationals are still restricted from operation. The Association also asserted that this was in 
contrast to U.S. regulations which already allow Mexican trucks to operate in the U.S. 
within a 25 mile radius.
The North American Committee on Agricultural Trade and the United Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetable Association, maintaining that their perishable shipments were at a disadvantage 
under current Mexican statutes, also supported the idea o f  pressuring Mexico to allow U.S. 
truckers circulation through Mexico within a designated area.
U.S. banks also expressed concern regarding access to the Mexican market and 
supported the harmonization o f  regulations in banking services, to ensure "equal 
opportunity". In the words o f  a representative o f  Citicorp that characterized the perspective 
o f  the U.S. banking industry: "They want to be able to branch out and conduct credit card 
business on an equal footing with Mexican banks".25
In a similar vein, U.S. banks voiced interest in expanding ownership o f  Mexican 
banks. Under current Mexican law, foreign ownership is limited to 30%, while Mexicans 
may freely invest in U.S. banks. According to the International Bank o f  Commerce, Mexican 
citizens have directly purchased banks in Brownsville, Laredo, and El Paso, Texas and have 
direct ownership o f  banks in California.26
While such issues are highly sensitive, the USTR generally pressed for the 
harmonization o f  regulations and increased access to the Mexican market by services, in the 
interests o f  transparency.
“ Written testimony by Ford W . Hall, Vice-President, Citicorp ( Houston: August 26, 1991)
“ Other financial issues mentioned included brokerage, insurance, and bonding services. The key 
concerns were again those o f  access and harmonization.
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8. Intellectual Property Rights: Enforcement
Concerns about intellectual property rights were centered on the ubiquitous question 
o f  enforcement. While these rights were mentioned tangentially in most testimonies, 
witnesses would frequently allude to the weak enforcement mechanisms present in Mexico. 
One witness in particular, the Industrial Biotechnology Association, used its entire statement 
to discuss the issue o f  intellectual property rights. Richard Godown, the president o f  the 
company, expressed concern regarding M exico’ s recent Industrial Property Protection and 
Development Law. He gave several specific examples as to how the law failed to provide 
adequate patent protection for many types o f  biotechnology inventions. In his concluding 
statement Mr. Godown expressed hope that NAFTA would make it a priority to improve the 
Mexican intellectual property law which he said "discriminates against biotechnology 
intellectual property. "27
9. Dispute Settlement: The Need for Mediation
One o f  the few testimonies on this issue was given by Matthew L. Benson, an 
attorney from the law firm o f Evans, Kosut, & Reed. Urging the committee to include a 
clause in the text providing mediation as a form o f  dispute settlement, he saw it as the fairest 
way to settle future disputes. Furthermore, "mediation will encourage trade development 
between our nations by minimizing the hazards o f  litigation and arbitration." Stressing his 
viewpoint that mediation was the easiest and best method o f  dispute settlement, he said that it 
"will increase the likelihood o f  success o f  the NAFTA agreement overall."28 Indeed, in the 
subsequent NAFTA negotiations, the importance o f  mediation was stressed, as questions o f 
dispute settlements necessarily touch upon sensitive issues o f  national sovereignty.
10. Environment: Standards and Enforcement
While several industries raised the allegedly lax enforcement o f  environmental 
regulations in Mexico as an unfair obstacle to free trade, several environmental groups also 
insisted on the inclusion o f  environmental regulations in the agreement. Several 
environmental groups simply expressed their disgruntlement in general terms. Groups such as 
the Sierra Club and Friends o f  the Earth, represented by the umbrella group "Public
27Testimony by Richard Godow n, President o f  the Industrial Biotechnology Association, (Washington, 
DC: September 3, 1991)
^Testimony by Michael Benson, Attorney, Evans, Kosut &  Reed (Houston: August 27, 1991)
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Citizen", offered no specific critiques or suggestions. Rather these organizations merely 
expressed their concern for the environment and their opposition to the manner in which the 
NAFTA was being negotiated.
By contrast, Edward K. Stimpson o f  the National Wildlife Federation testified on Sept 
4 that "under a NAFTA, U.S., Canadians, and other foreign investors will move to Mexico 
in search o f  weaker enforcement o f  environmental rules and regulations."29 Even so, while 
offering several criticisms o f  the NAFTA, the National Wildlife Federation did extend its 
support for the trade agreement, provided there were some enforcement mechanisms 
included. Also, the National Resource Defense Council offered its support for the agreement 
along with numerous specific constructive suggestions regarding the environment.
The environmental movement was, in essence, split down the middle. Some o f  the 
groups viewed NAFTA as a possible constructive solution to environmental problems along 
the border region. Others, namely the Sierra Club, Friends o f  the Earth, and Public Citizen, 
completely opposed the agreement. In fact, the latter went as far as to file a lawsuit calling 
for an Environmental Impact Statement (ESI), which would measure the effects o f  a free 
trade agreement on the environment, to be formulated by the administration under the 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The subsequent ruling favored these 
environmental groups, stating that the "NAFTA will have significant environmental effects" 
and "may worsen the environmental problems already existing in the United States-Mexico 
border areas."30 However, this ruling was rejected on appeal.
11. Labor: Disparities in Wage Levels
Labor proved to be a rather contentious issue given the large disparities existing in 
U.S. and Mexican average wage levels. Particularly, U.S. labor unions were resolute in their 
vehement opposition to the free trade treaty. At the Boston TPSC meeting, the Massachusetts 
division o f  the AFL-CIO provided emotional testimony. The union viewed the proposed 
NAFTA as a threat to employment in the U .S., citing lower wages and lax enforcement o f  
safety and environmental standards in Mexico as the reason for the "exodus" o f  jobs to the 
south. Expressing their concern with worker displacement, they urged the committee to 
include enforceable health, safety and environmental regulations, and also a "decent trade 
adjustment assistance program". The deposition presented on behalf o f  the president o f  the 
AFL-CIO offered specific examples o f  plant closings. In 1992, Foster Grant in Leominster, 
Massachusetts closed its eyeglass plant. Over 600 jobs were lost to a new plant in Nogales,
29Testimony given by Edward K. Stimpson, the National W ildlife Federation, (Washington, DC: 
September 4, 1991)
"“ "Judge in a Ruling That Could Delay Trade Pact", The New York Times. July 1, 1993
Mexico. The Raytheon Company in Waltham, Massachusetts, which produces, among other 
things, the Patriot missile, established two divisions in Tijuana, "costing hundreds" o f  jobs.31
Other groups also stressed the plant closings that resulted from companies shifting 
operations to Mexico in order to lower production costs. As stated earlier, Libbey Glass 
alluded to the wage differences existing between the United States and Mexico. The 
testimony presented by the International Brotherhood o f  Electrical Workers was based on 
"what has happened under the Maquiladora program." The union believes that 
approximately 30,000 jobs in U.S. manufacturing have been lost over the past six years, and 
that approximately 25,000 o f  these jobs were lost to Mexico. In addition to these 
organizations, the United Paperworkers International Union, the Association o f  Farmworker 
Opportunity Programs, and the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Workers o f  




The TPSC hearings enabled the U.S. Trade Representative to gauge the position to be 
adopted in the NAFTA negotiations. It is impossible to accurately assess the full impact o f 
the hearings on the USTR position. On the one hand, a careful reading o f  the NAFTA text to 
ascertain which points raised at the hearings were included in the text would only give partial 
evidence o f  the weight these hearings bore, given that the NAFTA text was the result o f  a 
painstaking negotiation process between three sovereign states. On the other hand, the 
testimonies were distributed to the respective negotiators, depending on the specific issues 
they addressed. In considering the various case studies, it remains clear that the hearings 
were instrumental in providing the USTR with an indicator o f  the level o f  support or 
opposition to specific issues that range from phase-out periods to harmonization in financial 
regulations. Negotiators also became aware o f  the political context o f  the NAFTA.
In addition, testimonies given by foreign interests provided U.S. negotiators with 
information that balanced testimony presented by U.S. private firms. In this sense, all 
concerned interests have the possibility o f  participating in a public forum while the U.S. 
trade position is still in the process o f  being defined.
As the content o f  the hearings attest, market access issues are o f  significant concern 
to most U.S. firms. Environmental and labor questions, especially with regards to standards 
and regulations, the groundskeepers o f  a "levelled playing field", carry a sizable weight in 
negotiations and assuredly will grow in importance in future free trade agreements. Dispute
31Testimony provided by Joseph C. Faherty, President o f  the Massachusetts AFL-CIO, (Boston, M A : 
September 11, 1991)
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settlement and enforcement mechanisms will continue to wield attention in future 
negotiations.
Moreover, the issue-by-issue approach to trade negotiation indicated by these hearings 
promotes the formation o f  issue-specific political coalitions. This suggests that governments 
and private interests may find it beneficial in future trade agreements to build alliances with 
different interests on a variety o f  issues. Indeed, these coalitions should be pursued at an 
initial stage before domestic interests, as well as negotiators, have consolidated their position. 
As the TPSC hearings suggest, much can be learned with regards to the positions o f  different 
interests groups and their role in the formation o f  the U.S. negotiating position.

